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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
with the train, automobile, and airplane being desirable, and accepted, in-
struments of social convenience. Yet, these same instruments are responsi-
ble for a tremendous loss of life, limb and property. Rather than penalize
the individual, society itself should bear the burden of the loss produced by
dangerous, but desirable, activity if it wishes to enjoy -the benefits of our
modern machine age. The focus of legal attention is shifting to the com-
pensation of the inevitable victims of a mechanized society.4 ' In the field
of industrial accident, this attention is reflected in workmen's compensation
and employer liability laws. Such laws are based upon the theory that an
activity should bear the loss which it produces. This theory could be ex-
tended to a system of compulsory liability insurance or social insurance.
These advancements, however, will be realized only in the distant future.
At present, our legal concept of negligence liability is based upon personal
fault. In such a system of tort law the doctrine of last clear chance plays a
significant role.42 This concept is useful as an instrument by which legal
decisions may be made to conform to current notions of justice. Perhaps
jurists and legal scholars will soon recognize and accept a more satisfactory
approach.
ROBERT WALTER JONES
Whither the Guidepost? Diversion of
Dedicated Lands
The consternation evidenced by the courts in attempting .to bind past
decisions concerning diversion of dedicated lands into a cohesive unit is
epitomized by the trial judge's remarks in the recent case of Board of Edu-
catton v. Unknown Hetrs.' In commenting upon the question of title to
dedicated lands, the court stated:
A study of these and other cases reveals an almost indiscriminate use
of such legal labels, brands or tags as "fee subject to a use," "fee held in
trust," "determinable fee," "a base or qualified fee," and others. And al-
though the legal profession has made almost a fetish of these and similar
words, they hold no magic in themselves. Rather, they lead to meaningless
by-paths of confusion with dead ends instead of acting as guideposts to
understandable and equitable solutions of everyday problems2
In this article an attempt will be made to analyze some of these confusing
"dead ends" relating particularly to diversion of dedicated lands and per-
haps uncover "guideposts" indicating a solution to this highly perplexing
problem.
"James, Acculent Lbility Reconsidered: The Impact of Lwbility Insurance, 57
YALE L. J. 549 (1948).
2 James, Last Clear Chance, A Transitional Doctrne, 47 YALE L. J. 704 (1938).
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The facts in a recent Illinois case 3 highlight the problem confronting
the courts as to what checks are to be placed upon a governing body an its
disposition of dedicated lands. In 1852 a plat was filed by the proprietors
of the -town of Virden, dividing the village into numbered lots. One block
in the center of town was not so numbered or divided, but instead, had
been designated as "public ground." The town of Virden had since main-
tained the property, erecting a city hall on one portion, which housed the
city jail, the town fire engine, a garage and a workshop. The city proposed
to lease a portion of the southeastern section to a separate municipal corpo-
ration providing fire protection for the entire public within its boundaries,
for the erection of a building to house fire fighting apparatus. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the city from leasing that portion of the "public ground,"
contending that the leasing and subsequent construction of a fire house
would be a diversion from the intended use. The plaintiff asserted that .the
land had been specifically dedicated as a public park, tide being held by
the municipality in trust for .the public; thus the city was without authority
to convey or lease any part thereof.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that although a portion of the "public
ground" had been used for park purposes, the city authorities had in the
past utilized other parts of the land for whatever public use they deemed
advisable. The court upheld the city's contention that the dedication was
unrestricted.4 Such a fire house, decided the court, would be in furtherance,
rather than restrictive of the public use to which the property had been
dedicated.
The court reasoned that by merely leasing the property the municipality
retained sufficient control to prevent an inconsistent use, in compliance
with its duty as -trustee to control the property for its intended use. By way
of dictum, the court further stated that an injunction would issue to prevent
a conveyance of the fee of the property, but there was no proof that such
an action was threatened or contemplated.
'On the other hand, the Ohio Supreme Court, when confronted with a
similar situation in Babmn v. Ashland,5 decided that a municipality could
convey the fee to dedicated lands. The city of Ashland, as holder of the
1128 N.E.2d 534 (Ohio Com. PL 1954)
'Id. at 545.
' Schien v. Virden, 5 M.2d 494, 126 N.E.2d 201 (1955).
'In like instances, where the words of dedication were ambiguous, Ohio has held
that the contemporaneous acts and declarations of the dedicator, and the usage of
the land may be adverted to, to explain the dedication. See Lebanon v. Warren
County, 9 Ohio 80 (1839); LeClercq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio (Part I) 217 (1835);
Cincinnati v. Hamilton County, 7 Ohio (Part I) 88 (1835); Brown v. Manmng, 6
Ohio 298 (1834).
'160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
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legal title to land designated "public ground" on -the town plat, was held to
have the power to convey that tide. The decision is indicative of the readi-
ness of Ohio courts to allow a municipality to dispose of dedicated lands
as it deems advisable, and to prevent title from reverting (even if it means
overruling a former Supreme Court decision, as was done m the Babis
case).P
Whenever possible, Ohio courts have shown a tendency -to hold that tile
never reverts and that there are no conditional or determinable fees, regard-
less of the phraseology used. In justifying certain decisions, the courts have
held that the intention of the parties is the guiding principle, while at other
times holding that it is not what the parties intended, but what they did
that governs.7 The treatment by the courts of such determinable or condi-
tional fees is not within the scope of this article.
The court in the Babm case interpreted the words "public ground" to
mean ground belongig to the public, and not ground to be ased by the
public. The public therefore, dearly has the authority to dispose of its own
land, within its powers of local self-government conferred by the Ohio
constitution.8 If, to the contrary, the words "public ground" were to be
interpreted as meaning ground to be used only by -the public, then it is
arguable that those representing the public can not sell -the dedicated land
because it would prevent the use by the public.9 To more fully appreciate
the implications of the decisions, a brief summary of the principles of
dedication will precede an analysis of Ohio's treatment of the subject.
DrmicATioN
A dedication may be defined as the devotion of land to a public use by
an unequivocal act of the owner of the fee, manifesting the intention that
it shall be used presently or in the future for such public use.10 There need
not be any consideration, since the public interests and the benefits derived
by the dedicator are sufficient .to support the dedication.' The basic dif-
'In Van Wert v. Inhabitants, 18 Ohio St. 221 (1868), it was held that if the "pub-
lic ground" ceases to be used by or for the public, there will be a reverter to those
who dedicated it or those daiming under them. The Babin case overruled that par-
ticular holding of the Van Wert case, stating that where land is dedicated to a public
use, and there is no provision for forfeiture or reversion, and the land is no longer
needed for such use or purpose, neither the dedicator nor his heirs will have any en-
forceable rights to prevent the sale of dedicated land by the city.
"For a detailed coverage of conditional and determinable fees, see Meade, Reverters
and Determinable Fees-Trend.of Ohio Decisions, 55 Ohio Op. 355 (1935).
8 OHio CONsT. art. XVIII § 3.
'ee Van Wert v. Inhabitants, 18 Ohio St. 221 (1868); Le Clercq v. Gallipolis, 7
Ohio (Part I) 217 (1835).
" Birmingham v. Graham, 202 Ala. 202, 79 So. 574 (1918).
' Babin v. Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953); Richards v. Cincan-
nati, 31 Ohio St. 506 (1877)
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ference between condemnation and dedication is that the former is com-
pulsory while the latter is voluntary. 1 2 A dedication differs from a grant
or gift in that there need not be a particular grantee in esse at the tne of
the dedication to give it effect.13 A dedication by an owner of the fee to
individuals is ineffectual, since the essence of a dedication -is that it shall
be for the use of the public at large.14
In Ohio, a dedication may be made in a number of ways. It can be
accomplished by express declarations or acts of the dedicator,' 5 by deed,'6
or by will. 7 A common method of dedication is by plat. It is accepted
in Ohio, in accordance with the general rule elsewhere,'8 that where the
owner of real property makes a plat thereof, showing streets, alleys, squares
or commons; sells lands with reference to said plat; and the public uses
such lands so dedicated in compliance with ,the provisions of -the dedication,
the dedicator, in the absence of any circumstances to indicate a limited or
private purpose, has thereby dedicated the lands to the public use. 9 Dedi-
cation in Ohio may be -by the common law20 or the statutory method,2'
either mode being equally efficacious.
Most state courts are an agreement that the public, with legislative
authorization, can determine the use of land generally dedicated to the
public without restrictions.22 If, however, the dedication has been made
for a specific purpose, the courts differ as to whether such land may be used
for purposes other than the dedication. Some hold that there is no power
in the legislature, -the municipality or the general public to use the land
for purposes other than those indicated in the dedication, even though the
changed use may be advantageous to the public.za Other courts place a
' Venable v. Wabash Western Ry., 112 Mo. 103, 20 S.W 493 (1892).
'Carter v. Portland, 4 Ore. 339 (1873).
'Snmth v. Dothan, 211 Ala. 338, 100 So. 501 (1924); Prescott v. Edwards, 117
Cal. 298, 49 Pac. 178 (1897).
'Hicksville v. Lantz, 153 Ohio St. 421, 92 N.E.2d 270 (1950); Penquite v. Law-
rence, 11 Ohio St. 274 (1860); Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440 (1858).
" Carter v. Swan, 114 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1953); Magic v. Basquin, 102
N.E.2d 42 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951).
'
7Winslow v. Cincinnati, 6 Ohio N.P. 47 (1899).
"16 AM. JuR., Dedicaton § 22 (1938).
"17 OHio JuR.2D, Dedications § 26 (1956).
'In Cincinnati and Springfield Ry. v. Carthage, 36 Ohio St. 631 (1881), the court
held that to have a valid common law dedication, there must be shown intent by the
owner to dedicate the land to the public use, evidenced by some unequivocal act, and
acceptance by the public.
' For a complete analysis of statutory dedication in Ohio, see 17 OHIo Jtm.2D, Ded-
cation §§ 41-58 (1956).
'Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N.E.2d 713 (1948); Fort Worth v. Burnett,
131 Texas 190, 114 S.W.2d 220 (1938).
"26 C. J. S., Dedication § 65 (1941).
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more liberal construction upon a dedication made for specific and defined
purposes when the fee is granted absolutely to the municipality. They hold
that if the legislature so authorizes, the use may be discontinued or applied
in any manner 24
DIVERsIoN IN OHIo
Diversion has been defined as any use of dedicated property inconsistent
with, or substantially interfering with the use of the property in the par-
ticular way for which it was dedicated.2 5 The objects and purposes of the
dedication must be construed with reference to conditions then existing
which gave rise -to the dedicatlon, 26 and when ambiguity arises, the con-
temporaneous acts and declarations of the dedicator and the subsequent use
of the land by the public will be considered 7 If the instrument relied
upon as a dedication is ambiguous, the construction given must be against
the dedicator and for -the public.28
Generally, earlier Ohio cases held the municipality to a fairly close com-
pliance with .the terms of dedication, while at the same time attempting to
apply the dedicated property to all public and beneficial purposes con-
sistent with the terms and purposes of the dedication.29  The court in
Brown v. Mannng0 enjoined the heirs of the dedicator from erecting cer-
tain commercial buildings on land previously dedicated as "P Square' and
subsequently used by the public as a public square.3'
In Langley v. Gallipolis,3 2 town officials were attempting to improve
land dedicated on the plat as "the place," by erecting an inclosure for the
use and benefit of -the public. The court held that the inclosure was for
the public good and would best accomplish the purpose of the dedication.
In an often-cited opinion, the court in part held:
The use and beneficial purposes of a public square or common, in a
village or city, where no special limitation or use is prescribed by the terms
213 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1155 (2d ed. 1928)
2126 C. J. S., Dedication § 66 (1941).
' Gifford v. Horton, 54 Wash. 595, 103 Pac. 988 (1909)
See note 4 supra.
226 C. J. S., Dedication § 40 (1941).
21State ex rel. Crabbe v. Sandusky, Mansfield and Newark Ry., 111 Ohio St. 512, 146
N.E. 58 (1924); Louisville and Nashville Ry. v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81
N.E. 983 (1907); Malone v. Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 643 (1876); Van Wert v. Inhabit-
ants, 18 Ohio St. 221 (1868); Langley v. Gallipolis, 2 Ohio St. 107 (1853); Le
Clercq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio (Part 1) 217 (1835)
2 6 Ohio 298 (1834).
'See also Cincinnati v. Hamilton Co., 7 Ohio (Part I) 88 (1835). In Huber v.
Gazley, 18 Ohio 18 (1849), the court held that a tract of land, designated on the
town plat as the "public square," was thereby dedicated to the use of the town and
no subsequent dispostion made of it by the original proprietor can affect such use.
12 Oho St. 107 (1853).
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of the dedication may be improved and ornamented for pleasure
grounds and amusements for recreation and health; or it may be used for
public buildings and places for the transaction of public business of the
people of the village or city, or it may be used for purposes of both pleas-
ure and business, but the place must, for the purposes of the dedication, re-
main free and common to the use of all the public. And an appropriation
to the private and individual use of any lot owner or particular dass of
lot owners of ground so dedicated, would be inconsistent with the objects
of the dedication and a plain diversion from its appropriate and legitimate
uses.'
Where land has been granted to the municipality, or conveyed in a
deed vesting absolute title, the municipality is authorized to hold and con-
vey the land for corporate purposes, or dispose of it as it deems proper, the
same as any individual.3 4 However when land is dedicated to the public
use, it has been held that the municipality's rights are passive and not
active, and officials representing the public may merely- manage and con-
trol the land so dedicated as trustees for the public, to whose use it is dedi-
cated, and cannot appropriate it to the individual use of the public.a5 This
holding is a crystallization of the earlier Ohio view which placed a limita-
tion on -the disposition of public lands.
When confronted with questions of diversion of public streets and
roads, the court, in Callen v Columbus Edison Electrc Lght Co.,38 held
that the erection of poles by a private lighting company at the curb in a
street and .the stringing of electric cable lines for the purpose of furnishing
energy to private takers was a diversion of the street from the purposes for
which it was dedicated. The courts have been increasingly liberal however,
in allowing uses of streets and highways for public purposes other than
those directly related to moving or passing travel and transportation, but
the public use must still remain dominant in the street notwithstanding the
construction of any public service or convenience.37 The court held in
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Elyra,38 that a municipal coun-
cil did not have the power to grant a railroad company the exclusive and
permanent occupation of a public street,39 A recent case dealing in part
'Langley v. Gallipolis, 2 0hio St. 108, 110 (1853).
'Babin v. Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
'First German Reformed Church v. Summit County, 3 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 303
(1902).
m'66 Ohio St. 166, 64 NE. 141 (1902).
'See 17 OHio JUR.2D, Dedication § 73 (1956).
169 Ohio St 414, 69 N.E. 738 (1904).
'In Mount Vernon v. Berman and Reed, 100 Ohio St. 1, 125 N.E. 116 (1919),
the court held that rights in streets or highways granted to public service corporations
such as public transportation companies or public utilities are at all times held in
subordination to the superior public use.
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with .the use of the streets4" held that the defendant's stirring up of in-
dustrial strife by its picketing on the public streets and sidewalks was a
diversion of the dedicated use for public travel and transportation.
ALIENATION
Ohio statutes have vested the -fee to lands dedicated by plat in the
municipal corporation in trust for the uses and purposes set forth.41 A
proper extension of the statutes, in conformity with the modern theory of
dedication, would be that the title to all dedicated lands, platted or other-
wise, would vest in the municipality, to be held in trust for the purposes
of the dedication. The question of whether the municipality may subse-
quently alienate -the fee was highlighted in the Babin case, the court hold-
ing that the city, without any special condemnation proceedings, could
authorize, by ordinance, the sale of land held in trust for the public. The
court determined that land designated on a town plat as "public ground"
was meant to be land belonging to the public, not ground to be used only
by the public. Hence the city officials, after determining that land was
no longer needed for the public use, could sell the land belonging to the
City.
4 2
It is submitted that when such land was dedicated and subsequently used
as a "public ground," the dedication was a restrictive one, limiting -the land
to use only by the public. Consequently the legislative body of the city,
even though it did not abuse its discretion in determining that -the land
was no longer needed for public purposes, by such ordinance only alienated
the fee of the dedicated lands, but not the use, which by the substantive
principles of dedication, remained solely for the benefit of the public. Even
if the municipality was properly exercising its right of eminent domain by
an appropriation of the land, such an appropriation of property that has
been dedicated for a specific public use can only be made for another public
purpose.43 To facilitate its conclusion that the city could sell its own lands
' Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E.2d 823 (1955)
"See OHIO REV. CODE § 711.07. This section appears to be incompatible with
OHIO REV. CODE § 711.11, which also vests a fee subject to the uses for which the
land was dedicated in the county in which the village is situated. However OHIO
REv. CODE § 711.07 was originally a part of OHIO REV. STAT. § 2601 and related
to grounds within an incorporated municipality. OHIO REV. CODE § 711.11 was
part of OHIO 1Ev. STAT. § 2604 and in its original form expressly provided that
plats of maps "other than those mentioned in section 2601," would be sufficient to
vest fee in the county. The legislature apparently intended to vest title to dedicated
lands in fee in the municipality in trust to and for the uses and purposes of the dedi-
cation and that all other public properties, situated in an unincorporated town or
hamlet, should vest in fee in the county, for such uses and purposes.
"Babin v. Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953)
4See OHIO REv. CODE § 719.01, which lists the various purposes for which land
may be appropriated under eminent domain proceedings.
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without special condemnation proceedings, the Babn court sanctioned an
unwarranted legislative short-cut by the municipality. The court's in-
terpretation of the words of dedication is irreconcilable with the sub.
stantive principles of dedication, and runs contrary to a series of older Ohio
decisions. In LeClercq v. Gallipolis,44 the court had stated:
The fee of lands dedicated to public objects sometimes passes directly
to the corporation for whose use it is intended, and is sometimes held by
a corporate town, or a county, in trust for the uses designated. In the first
case, as where land is given to a town for corporate purposes, or where
land is acquired by a county for purchase, or where given for county ob-
jects, an absolute estate is held by the corporation, which they may alien.
But when the corporation takes as trustees, to hold to prescribed uses, the
cestus que use acquires a vested estate, the enjoyment of which may be ob-
tained in chancery.'
Two lots were dedicated for "school purposes" in Van lWert v. Edson,4
but were subsequently rendered unsuitable and even dangerous for school
purposes because of the subsequent location of a railroad depot nearby.
The board of education requested the court to order that the lots be sold and
the proceeds applied to the purchase of a suitable schoolhouse site. The
court held that the dedication was for a specific use and conferred no power
of alienation to extinguish that use, stating that the trust created by the
dedication was for school purposes and none other. The court stated that
the principle upon which a trust may, under certain circumstances, be
executed cy pres was not applicable.47 The court further held that if the
use created by the dedication was abandoned or should become impossible
of execution, the premises would revert to the dedicators or their repre-
sentatives. This particular holding is irreconcilable with the modern treat-
ment of dedication and was properly overruled in the Babsn case.
Another Ohio case following the Van Weft rule was Loazstlle & Nash-
ville Rd. Co. v. CirnCnna;t, 48 in which the court held that neither the state
nor the municipality within which the dedicated property is situated has
a proprietary interest which can be sold or diverted to any use inconsistent
with the purpose of the dedication. The court stated:
It is so easy to give away the property of others, so difficult to preserve
public rights, that it is necessary in order to defeat the former and effect
7 Ohio (Part I) 217 (1835).
"Id. at 221. The Babin court distinguished the Le Clercq case by stating that in the
dedicanon of the "public place" in Le Clercq, private property rights were acquired
by the abutters, while in Babso, no private property rights were vested in those
abutting on the "public ground."
' 18 Ohio St. 221, 226 (1868).
11d. at 228.
'76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N.E. 983 (1907).
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the latter that the power to control the use of property dedicated to the
public must be limited to the purposes of the trust.'
Galion v, Gaion50 corroborates this holding that public streets, squares,
landings and grounds are held in trust for the public in accordance with the
provisions of the dedication and are subject to the property rights of abut-
ting owners under the absolute control of the legislative power of the state.
Northern Boiler Co. v. Davu15 ' also dels with the rights of abutting prop-
erty owners in dedicated lands, a problem which is not within the scope of
this artile 52
CY PmnS - A GUIDEPOST
In Zanesville v. Zanesville Canal & Mfg. Co.,53 a municipal corporation
wanted to appropriate property previously dedicated for use as a market
house, for the purpose of a public office building and prison. The court
held that since the originally intended use had become obsolete, the city
could appropriate the property and hold it in trust for a public use different
from the one for which it was originally dedicated. In upholding the ap-
propriation the court made passing reference to the cy pres doctrine,5
citing the LeClercq case, which stated:
Where circumstances are so changed that the dedication cannot be liter-
ally carried into effect, the legislature or the court in those cases where gen-
eral intention can be effected, may lawfully in some cases, enforce its
execution as nearly as circumstances permit, by the application of the doc-
trine of cy pres.'
In First German Reformed Church v. Weikel,5" there was a gift of land
to be used as a parsonage, which subsequently became unsuitable for that
purpose. The court permitted the sale of the property and ordered the pro-
ceeds to be invested in a new location and parsonage, any surplus to be
applied to its maintenance. 7
"Id. at 504, 505, 81 N.E. at 989.
'3154 Ohio St. 503, 96 N.E.2d 881 (1951).
"157 Ohio St. 564, 106 N.E.2d 620 (1952).
'See 17 OHIO JUR.2D, Dedication § 89 (1956)
' 100 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 159 Ohio St. 203,
111 N.E.2d 922 (1953) On retrial in 116 N.E.2d 54 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1953),
the trial court expressed the same holding as previously cited.
" The cy pres doctrine is applied where literal execution of the trust of a charitable
gift is inexpedient and impracticable. Equity will execute the purpose as nearly as it
can, according to the original plan, but the doctrine applies only where the testator
has manifested the general intention to give to charity. 7 Omo JuR., Charities §
38 (1929).
'3Le Clercq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio (Part I) 217, 221 (1835)
" 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377, 19 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 239 (1908).
'See also Gearhart v. Richardson, 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890 (1924); Amen-
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The court in Van Wert v. Edson, however, held that the cy pres doctrine
was inapplicable, as did the court in Allen v. Bellefontaine,58 in which it
held that a home bequeathed as a memorial to the testatrx's late husband
as a meeting place and research home for local physicians was a memorial
to the late husband and not a dedication to the general public. Thus the
sale of the house and the proceeds therefrom to be applied to local hospitals
was unauthorized.
CONCLUSION
Public habits, needs and advancements often render inapplicable the
use of dedicated lands; consequently the courts must recognize social,
economic and political changes and strive to meet changing public needs.
Of primary importance is the intent of the dedicator, which may be deter-
mined by his contemporaneous acts and declarations, and his acquiescence
in the use of the land. In those instances where the dedicator evidences an
intent to dedicate his land to the public use generally, without specifications
or reservations, it is submitted that a municipality, under an extension of the
cy pres doctrine, within its powers of local self-government, may divert
the land .to other uses beneficial to the public. Likewise the land may be
leased or alienated if the proceeds therefrom are applied to the public use.
However, when the dedicator specifically declares in an unequivocal
manner the particular use to which the dedicated land shall be applied, it
is submitted that the dedicator meant the land not only to belong to ,the
public, but also to be used only by the public, and a subsequent alienation,
for a private use by public authorities, even when the land is decidedly un-
suitable for the purpose that it was dedicated, is unwarranted. Since the
land in a restricted dedication is to -be used only by the public, if the appli-
cation of the specific intention of the dedicator has proven impossible, the
court may, by an extension of the cy pres doctrine, give effect -to the general
intention of the dedicator as nearly as possible by utilizing the land in some
other way that would prove beneficial to the public.
It is submitted that this is the only logical result when such a restricted
dedication occurs. The land may be diverted to other uses beneficial to
the public, since the use still remains with the public, but the cy pres doc-
trine should not be applied when the municipality attempts to alienate land
that has -been restictively dedicated. The public acquired only the right to-
the physical use of .the land instead of the income and proceeds therefrom,
can Tract Society v. Atwater, 30 Ohio St. 77 (1876); Mcntyre v. Zanesville, 17
Ohio St. 352 (1867); Hullman v. Hancomp, 5 Ohio St. 237 (1855); Williams v.
First Presbyterian Socaety, 1 Ohio St. 478 (1853); Zanesville Canal and Mfg. Co. v.
Zanesville, 20 Ohio 483 (1852); American Legion v. Collville, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
375 (1925); Cincinnati v. McMicken, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 188 (1892).
'47 Ohio App. 359, 191 N.E. 896 (1934).
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